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Abstract 
 
Web service-oriented architecture (WSOA) is a 
promising paradigm for future software development. 
Necessary identity management (IdM) architectures 
for WSOA are just being prepared to enable fine-
grained access control. With the loose coupling of Web 
services with cross-cutting identity services the 
question arises how to develop access control policies 
for Web services. In this paper we present a model-
driven approach defining access control policies which 
are independent from the IdM architecture to which 
they are later applied. Therefore we develop a 
platform-independent access control model for WSOA 
and derive a platform-specific model from a given IdM 
product. We show how to map both models to a 
concrete language. Access control policies are then 
defined using our platform-independent language and 
transformed to platform-specific policies using 
explicitly defined transformation rules. We present a 
case study that applies our approach. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Currently, most enterprises try to align their 
business processes with the supporting IT by migrating 
towards Web service-oriented architecture (WSOA) 
[8]. Besides the development of WSOA’s core 
concerns (cf. to separation of concerns [4]) there are 
cross-cutting concerns that have to be addressed before 
being able to go productive with WSOA, a central one 
is enabling security, especially access control [12]. 
Access control consists of authentication and 
authorization verification. Authorization verifications 
are made by the IdM architecture, typically at a 
component called policy decision point (PDP) and are 
enforced by a component called policy enforcement 
point (PEP). We presented an architectural blueprint of 
a WSOA-aware IdM architecture in [6]. 
In this paper we build upon our conceptual access 
control metamodel for WSOA presented in [5] and 
develop a domain-specific language called Web 
Services Access Control Markup Language 
(WSACML). While our conceptual access control 
metamodel defines the sets and relations necessary for 
the decision on authorization verification requests, 
WSACML defines an appurtenant language for the 
expression of such policies. WSACML defines the 
platform-independent model (PIM) in the context of 
OMG’s model-driven architecture (MDA) [11] 
considering the IdM product as the exchangeable 
platform. The goal is that during Web service 
development its security aspects can be defined in 
parallel. Policies can then be modeled independently 
from the IdM architecture that will be used at service 
runtime. When deploying the Web service, its policy is 
transformed conforming to the policy metamodel of 
the given IdM product and deployed there. This allows 
Web service developers to reduce dependencies 
towards an IdM product and to incorporate IdM as a 
loosely-coupled infrastructural service. 
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Figure 1. Transformation of 
Access Control Policies 
The contributions of this paper are: 
 
1. We define a policy model for Web service-
oriented architecture that is platform-independent 
from a given IdM product and we present a concrete 
language which applies this model called Web 
Services Access Control Markup Language 
(WSACML). 
2. We show how to derive a platform-specific 
policy model of an existing IdM product and how to 
link these two models using explicitly defined 
transformation rules. This allows for a model-driven 
development starting with platform-independent 
policies. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives 
the background on access control and model-driven 
development and discusses related work. In section 3 
we present WSACML as a platform-independent 
access control policy language for Web Services. In 
section 4 we show how to derive a platform-specific 
policy metamodel of a state-of-the-art IdM product and 
how to couple it with the platform-independent one. In 
section 5 our approach is applied practically in a case 
study. A conclusion and an outlook on our future work 
in this area close the body of the paper. 
 
2. Background and Related Work 
 
2.1. Access Control Models 
 
The purpose of access control models is to define 
sets and relations for the definition of authorization 
statements which are used to make access control 
decisions. The core of access control models is about 
the definition of the so-called subject/object-relation 
[9] which formally models an active subject for getting 
access to a protected object. Role-based access control 
(RBAC) [15] introduces the role element as an 
indirection between subjects and objects. Subjects are 
assigned to (business) roles and authorization is not 
granted to individuals but to roles which eases 
administration. 
An enhancement of RBAC for Web services is 
introduced in [17] featuring attribute-based access 
control (ABAC). It allows for complete decoupling of 
subjects and objects. Both are characterized by 
attributes, e.g. their metadata. Policies very abstractly 
define general authorization statements. While this 
approach offers much flexibility, the problems not 
solved yet are about a concrete policy language which 
needs to be very precise to handle this independence in 
the subject/object-relation. The decoupling of policies 
from the objects to be protected adds complexity as 
policy matching algorithms are needed which are not 
introduced in [17]. A policy decision point that is able 
to handle this flexibility has not been presented in this 
work either. 
The OASIS standard eXtensible Access Control 
Markup Language (XACML) [16] allows for modeling 
of platform-independent access control policies. 
XACML does not focus on the Web service domain 
but is a general policy language. It features the 
decoupling of access control policies from concrete 
objects using policy matching algorithms and a 
generalized way of characterizing subjects and objects 
using attributes. Focusing on WSOA, the object to be 
protected is the Web service operation defined by its 
signature in WSDL. Due to the granularity of a Web 
service operation it is not enough to only take care of 
its static aspects but the operation’s parameters that are 
sent during invocation must also be considered. 
XACML-compliant policy artifacts are voluminous 
due to XACML’s notable syntactical overhead, which 
hinders its usage for business process designers. IdM 
products setting up on generalized XACML-based 
access control policies are rather seldom at present. 
These characteristics do not favor XACML to be a 
suitable policy language for Web service development. 
 
2.2. Model-Driven Policy Development 
 
Model-driven development is an approach to 
software development that focuses on models and their 
transformations as primary engineering artifacts. OMG 
did a specification of this general approach called 
model-driven architecture (MDA) [11]. The core 
elements are platform-independent models (PIM) and 
platform-specific models (PSM). The link between 
such two models is drawn by transformation rules, 
specified between elements of the respective 
metamodels. 
The early treatment of security and especially 
access control has evolved to be a critical factor in 
software development projects. The integration of 
specifying access control in Web service development 
processes still lacks a standardized approach. Thinking 
of model-driven development of access control 
policies for the Web services domain, a domain-
specific but platform-independent policy language is a 
necessary prerequisite. Well-established security 
infrastructures are already in use for protecting 
traditional Web applications, so it is reasonable to 
integrate them into the Web services world. 
Compliance requirements and therefore the explicit 
definition of security aspects are drivers for refactoring 
existing platform-specific policies to platform-
independent ones making them understandable in a 
better way for business analysts. 
A contribution to model-driven security is given in 
[1]. To integrate access control aspects into the Web 
services development process the authors defined an 
OCL-like grammar for modeling authorization 
knowledge and developed a transformation tool which 
accepts this grammar for the generation of platform-
independent XACML-compliant policies. They 
suggest attaching the authorization knowledge during 
software design phase to interface models. Proceeding 
to implementation phases they transform this 
knowledge into XACML-compliant policies. They 
suggest employing XACML as target platform but 
neglect the integration of existing security 
infrastructures. To be effectively applicable, a further 
transformation step into a given IdM product is 
missing. 
A further approach to model-driven security is 
given by [2]. The authors suggest a development 
process that combines platform-independent models 
based on OMG MOF [13], one for system design with 
another one concerning security aspects. Additionally, 
a tool is presented to transform the platform-
independent authorization models into a platform-
specific representation for JEE and .NET components. 
They discuss a generic methodology for integrating 
security aspects into software development processes, 
but an employable instantiation of this approach for 
use in the Web service domain is not presented neither 
for the system design metamodel nor the security 
design language. Moreover, MOF-based metamodeling 
is a heavyweight extension of UML in the sense that it 
requires superior competences from security architects 
and lacks tool support. Furthermore, it is complicated 
to enhance the policy model towards Web service 
domain, especially to consider Web service invocation 
parameters. Additionally, the transformation rules 
presented are very specific to the integrated security 
models of JEE and .NET platform. A transformation to 
a loosely-coupled IdM product is somewhat more 
complicated as policy models are very different - a fact 
that is not addressed. 
 
3. Web Services Access Control Markup 
Language 
 
In this section we present Web Services Access 
Control Markup Language (WSACML), an XML-
based language for the definition of access control 
policies for Web services. WSACML policies are 
independent from the IdM product which is used later, 
so they relate to the platform-independent model (PIM) 
of MDA. They build the first step for model-driven 
policy development. WSACML extends our domain-
specific conceptual access control metamodel for Web 
service-oriented architecture as defined in [5] towards 
a concrete language. First we give an overview of the 
relevant sets and relations for access control policies in 
Web service-oriented architecture. 
The objects to be protected in WSOA are Web 
service operations provided by atomic Web services or 
compositions. As their interfaces are technically the 
same, their access control policies can be handled 
similarly. Following the WSOA paradigm, a mapping 
from business processes towards Web services 
covering the IT-supported parts takes place. Taking 
access control for Web services into consideration, we 
focus on so-called usage contexts of a Web service. 
From a business perspective a usage context directly 
relates to the invocation of a Web service during a 
concrete business process. A usage context describes 
which subjects (users or user agents) should have 
access to specific objects to accomplish their tasks or 
to meet other business requirements. Access control 
requirements are to be directly derived from a usage 
context. 
A subject, e.g. a human user or a self-acting 
service, is defined by a collection of various subject 
attributes forming its digital identity. Considering just 
the subject’s business role does not scale with a 
constantly growing number of fine-grained Web 
services as argued in [17]. Furthermore, role-based 
access control is currently one of the most relevant 
concepts in enterprise level access control systems and 
it is strongly related to business process modeling. As 
practical experience shows, the mapping of business 
roles to system roles is always cumbersome. Our 
approach allows a business role to be represented 
either by a specific subject attribute carrying the role 
or it can be mapped to a role-specific set of subject 
attributes. 
The signature of a Web service operation 
aggregates several parameters, input parameters as 
well as output parameters. Constraining input 
parameters in dependency to a usage context enables 
fine-grained access control. This allows for instance 
the comparison between input parameters and 
attributes of the calling subject. An example for the 
checking of input parameters is given in the case study. 
Besides subject attributes and input parameters, 
constraints on environment attributes like time 
period or location are also relevant to describe usage 
contexts and to make access control decisions. 
 
 
Figure 2. Abstract Syntax of WSACML 
 
In figure 2 the abstract syntax of WSACML is 
depicted as an UML class diagram. The top-level 
element Policy is identified by its attribute Name and 
bound to an object by its attribute 
ServiceOperationBinding referencing a Web service 
operation as listed in the service registry. Furthermore, 
it defines a RuleSelectionAlgorithm describing what is 
done if more than one Rule is applicable. Deny-
overrides implies that explicit prohibitions (deny-rules) 
have precedence over permissions (permit-rules). 
First-applicable is another algorithm which determines 
the first matching Rule of a Policy to define the result 
of an access control decision. 
A Policy is an ordered list of Rules (cf. to 
RuleSeclectionAlgorithm) which themselves have an 
identifying Name and an Effect. The Effect describes 
what happens if a Rule is applicable. Most common 
Effects are Permit and Deny. A Rule aggregates several 
Assertions and is applicable if all of its Assertions 
evaluate to true. An Assertion is a predicate that 
requires two arguments. It combines two variables or a 
variable and a constant value using an 
AssertionFunction like equal, unequal, greater-than-
equal etc. To reflect the different entities that 
participate in an access context, variables are divided 
into four categories SubjectAttributes, 
ObjectAttributes, InputParameters and 
EnvironmentAttributes. WSACML allows that two 
variables are treated as arguments of Assertions. This 
enables for instance comparing an InputParameter of a 
service invocation with SubjectAttributes of the calling 
subject. A Rule’s Effect is only enforced if the Rule is 
applicable, which means that all of its Assertions are 
evaluated to true. If a Rule is not applicable, it implies 
that the Web service’s usage context does not match 
and that the subject is not authorized. 
Since a WSACML Policy is basically a pointer to 
concrete Rules, the administrative advantage of re-
using Rules within Policies of other Web services is 
featured. If another Web service is deployed which is 
used in similar usage contexts, its Policy can be built 
from existing Rules. Additionally, a Policy of an 
existing Web service that is required to be accessed in 
another usage context is just extended by an additional 
Rule which covers the relevant Assertions for the new 
usage context. If the access requirements of an existing 
usage context change, only the appropriate Rule needs 
to be updated to adapt the Policies of all Web service 
operations associated with that usage context. The 
Policy of a Web service composition needs to include 
all Policies of the Web services operations it does 
invoke by all means. This allows for a pre-checking as 
the first step in a Web service composition and may 
reduce the need for roll-back operations. 
We use XML as the concrete syntax for WSACML, 
so the abstract syntax depicted in figure 2 has to be 
transformed to XML Schema (XSD). [10] describes a 
general way of mapping. The transformation maps 
UML classes to XSD complex types, UML attributes 
to XSD attributes and UML aggregations to XSD 
sequences. Policy and Rule classes were stereotyped 
with <<root>> to generate XSD top-level elements. 
Namespaces were retightened manually, as well as 
constraints like the restricted occurrence of variables 
and constants as child nodes of an assertion. 
It is important to recognize that WSACML only 
gives the structure of the language but does not give 
the vocabulary in the sense of the concrete names of 
the attributes of subjects, objects, parameters and 
environment that are available to set up access control 
policies. The vocabulary depends on the given 
business and IT environment and needs to be created 
in advance. It can be enhanced at anytime. In our case 
study in section 5 we present a snapshot of an 
exemplary vocabulary. 
 
4. Deriving Platform-Specific Policy 
Metamodels 
 
After having defined a platform-independent policy 
model, we show in this section how a policy 
metamodel for an existing security infrastructure can 
be refactored exemplarily treating CA eTrust 
SiteMinder [3] being a state-of-the-art IdM suite. 
Subsequently we show how a model-to-model 
transformation is utilized to generate platform-specific 
policies from WSACML ones. 
4.1. CA eTrust SiteMinder as a specific IdM 
Platform 
 
SiteMinder is an enterprise-level policy-based Web 
access management platform. Web agents are hooked 
into distributed Web servers and application servers 
and act as policy enforcement points. They intercept 
access requests, forward them to the centralized policy 
decision point and enforce access decisions. Policies 
can be authored via a Web-based administration applet 
or using a given Java-based policy API. Policies are 
maintained in an LDAP-based policy store, which was 
the starting point for obtaining the subset of 
SiteMinder’s policy model relevant for authorization. 
Figure 3 depicts the platform-specific abstract 
SiteMinder policy syntax. As there is neither an 
explicit definition nor a specification of SiteMinder’s 
backend policy model, we derived the semantics of 
objects and attributes by reverse engineering using the 
policy API and the policy design guide. 
 
 
Figure 3. Abstract Syntax of 
SiteMinder Policy Model 
 
Figure 3 shows the relevant SiteMinder’s object 
classes that are used to formulate authorization 
statements. In the SiteMinder model authorization is 
bound to resources by the attribute ResourceFilter 
which is part of the object SmRealm. SmRealm 
corresponds to a subset of an URL. The PolicyLink 
links a realm to a policy, called SmPolicy. SmPolicy 
allows for time- and location-based restrictions and 
directly links towards user filters, called 
SmUserPolicy. Authorized users are determined via 
SmUserPolicy objects which allow the definition of 
LDAP-based user filters. SmRule is the third element 
of the PolicyLink and determines whether an 
authorization statement permits or denies access. Other 
attributes owned by the related object classes that are 
not shown here mainly contain configuration settings, 
e.g. for each SmUserPolicy a specific connection 
between a policy server and different user directories 
can be defined. 
To be usable for policy transformation, the 
SiteMinder UML diagram has to be transformed to an 
XSD schema as well by applying the same 
transformation as we did for the PIM described in the 
previous section. We ensured that classes and 
attributes are directly related to their policy API 
counterparts. When proceeding to deployment a policy 
import tool only needs to parse the XML-based 
SiteMinder policy and settings files and generate the 
appropriate SiteMinder objects forming the platform-
specific code (PSC). 
 
4.2. Defining PIM to PSM Transformation 
 
After defining the platform-independent and the 
platform-specific model, these need to be linked via 
explicit transformation rules. Development of 
transformation rules between both policy models 
primarily consists of three steps: 
1. Provide abstract syntax trees for both input models 
and output models 
 
Since XSLT is selected as the transformation 
language, source and target trees are provided as XML 
schema (XSD). The abstract syntax for the source tree 
is provided by WSACML XSD (generated from figure 
2) and the abstract syntax for the target tree is provided 
by SiteMinder XSD (generated from figure 3). 
2. Formulate conceptual transformation rules 
 
In this step concepts of PIM are to be mapped 
towards PSM. As both models can substantially differ 
the actual linking should be assisted by an expert of the 
PSM environment as this model is usually substantially 
more complicated to understand. First the 
transformation rules which are to be formalized in the 
next step are to be formulated on a conceptual basis. 
Mapping can be initiated by identifying semantically 
equivalent sub trees in both models which can be 
started at the root node. It is useful to work with rule 
patterns e.g. direct mapping, mapping with type cast, 
or restructuring rules. Examples of the three kinds of 
rules are shown in table 1. The first entry is a direct 
mapping of WSACML Policy elements to 
SiteMinder’s SmRealm. If semantics and structure are 
equivalent but types and names differ, transformation 
involves type casting and renaming. An example for 
type casting is the second rule in table 1. It does a 
mapping of String-typed attribute Effect of a 
WSACML Rule to the attribute AllowAccess of 
Boolean type owned by SiteMinder SmRule. 
Table 1. Conceptual Transformation Rules 
Source:  
WSACML 
Transformation Target: 
SiteMinder 
Policy  SmRealm 
Rule/ 
@Effect 
Permit ? true  
Deny ? false 
SmRule/ 
@AllowAccess 
Assertion 
/SubjectAtt
ribute 
/@Name= 
role 
?‘cn =’+ 
@Value+’, ou = 
roles, dc = com’ 
?organizationalUni
t 
?5 
?0 
smUserPolicy/ 
@FilterPath 
@FilterClass 
@PolicyRes. 
@PolicyFlags 
 
The third example in table 1 is about a complex 
restructuring rule. SiteMinder does not explicitly 
support WSACML’s concept of Assertions. Required 
attribute statements are distributed over several LDAP 
objects combined to a SiteMinder policy. The example 
shows how to map an assertion concerning a concrete 
subject attribute from WSACML’s model to 
SiteMinder’s model. It takes the value of the subject 
attribute “role” and converts it to a LDAP search 
expression. This affects the four attributes of 
SiteMinder’s smUserPolicy: FilterPath accepts an 
LDAP search expression, which is concatenated from 
“cn=” in case of SubjectAttribute/@Name=role and a 
literal derived from Constant/@Value and the 
remainder “ou=roles, dc=com”. FilterClass defines the 
object class of the directory object specified by 
FilterPath, here an LDAP object of type 
“organizationUnit”. PolicyResolution describes the 
relation between the directory object and the subject. 
In the actual case “5” indicates that the subject’s 
distinguished name is a member of the directory object 
(organizationalUnit). PolicyFlags’s value of “0” 
indicates that neither exclusion nor recursion due to 
nested groups is required by the policy. 
3. Formalize rules by mapping them to concrete 
transformation technology 
 
SiteMinder’s view on policy and rule elements is 
different from the view presented by WSACML, i.e. 
SiteMinder policies are user centric whereas 
WSACML policies are resource-centric. So a 
WSACML Policy is mapped to SmRealm and a Rule is 
mapped to both SmRule and SmPolicy which are linked 
together by PolicyLink. 
<xsl:template match=„Rule">
<PolicyLink>
<SmRule>
<xsl:attribute name=„Name">
<xsl:value-of select='@Name'/>
</xsl:attribute>
<xsl:attribute name=„AllowAccess">
<xsl:value-of select="@Effect = 'permit'"/>
</xsl:attribute>
</SmRule>
<SmPolicy>
<xsl:attribute name=„Name">
<xsl:value-of select='@Name'/>
</xsl:attribute>
<xsl:apply-templates/>
</SmPolicy>
</PolicyLink>
</xsl:template>  
Figure 4. Exemplary XSLT 
Transformation Rule 
 
In figure 4 we show an exemplary excerpt of the 
formalization of the conceptual transformation rules 
using XSLT. It shows how to map the WSACML 
Rules to SiteMinder’s policy model in XML (PSM). 
The XSLT-based transformation is applied when the 
XPath expression assigned to the attribute “match” is 
matched by a node or node set of the source tree. This 
results in appending the body of <xsl:template> to the 
target tree. The transformation involves type casting 
from String-valued WSACML Rule/@Effect to 
Boolean-valued SiteMinder SmRule/@AllowAccess. 
The instruction <xsl:apply-templates> causes the 
XSLT processor to search for applicable 
transformation rules at this point. 
 
5. Case Study 
 
An integration project at our university applies a 
WSOA-based approach to encapsulate functionality of 
existing heterogeneous software systems at reusable 
Web services. These services are then to be composed 
following specified business processes. These 
processes are designed with UML use case and activity 
diagrams and are mapped to component and service 
diagrams [7]. 
student
counselor
ToRService
createToR
«usageContext»
StudentConsultation
«usageContext»
StudentSelfService
 
Figure 5. Associating 
Usage Contexts with Objects 
 
UML use case diagrams which abstractly describe 
the functional requirements build the starting point of a 
Web service development project. Access control 
aspects as non-functional requirements are integrated 
into such analysis models by enhancing the model 
semantics using stereotypes. In figure 5, we show our 
enhancement adding so-called “usage contexts”. The 
given example addresses a service providing a 
transcript of records (ToR). It is offered by a Web 
service called ToRService at the operation 
“createToR”. This functionality can be accessed by 
different roles in different usage contexts. A student 
may get access for self-service (usage context 
StudentSelfService) and is then allowed to get his ToR 
only. In contrast a counselor in usage context 
StudentConsultation is allowed to access the ToR of all 
students. 
 
Figure 6. Exemplary WSACML Vocabulary 
 
Before being able to specify these usage contexts as 
WSACML Rules that build the WSACML Policy for 
the “createToR” Web service operation, the concrete 
vocabulary has to be defined. According to our 
metamodel depicted in section 3, four areas have to be 
covered: attributes of subjects are to be derived from 
the user repository, object attributes are an aggregation 
of existing metadata, input parameters are to be 
derived from the existing Web service interfaces and 
environment attributes are to be specified according to 
the project’s needs. This vocabulary is not fixed but 
can be flexibly extended by new attributes as this does 
not affect existing WSACML Rules. The attributes 
provide the vocabulary for the access control language 
WSACML. Figure 6 exemplarily depicts a reduced 
view of our WSACML vocabulary comprising all 
attributes that may be dynamically resolved on access 
request. 
From the enhanced use case diagram, a WSACML 
Policy is generated for each use case corresponding to 
a Web service operation. While the aggregation of all 
usage contexts defines the overall WSACML Policy of 
a Web service operation, each usage context maps to 
an individual WSACML Rule. This Rule puts together 
all necessary Assertions that must hold for the Rule to 
be applicable. It sets up on the vocabulary of attributes 
as defined before. 
<Policy Name=„createToR_policy" 
ServiceOperationBinding=„ToRService/createToR“
RuleSelectionAlgorithm=„first-applicable “>
<RuleRef>StudentSelfService</RuleRef>
<RuleRef>StudentConsultation</RuleRef>
</Policy>
<Rule Name=„StudentSelfService“ Effect=„permit“>
<Assertion AssertionFunction="equal">
<SubjectAttribute Name="role" />
<Constant Value="student" />
</Assertion>
<Assertion AssertionFunction="equal">
<SubjectAttribute Name=„identifier“ />
<InputParameter Name="matriculation" />
</Assertion>
</Rule>
<Rule Name=„StudentConsultation“ Effect=„permit“>
<Assertion AssertionFunction="equal">
<SubjectAttribute Name="role" />
<Constant Value="counselor" />
</Assertion>
</Rule>  
Figure 7. Exemplary WSACML Policy / Rules 
 
In figure 7 an exemplary WSACML Policy and 
corresponding Rules are depicted. The Policy has the 
name “createToR_policy” and is bound to the Web 
service operation “ToRService/createToR” as specified 
during service design. From the two usage contexts 
StudentSelfService and StudentConsultation as 
depicted in the enhanced UML use case diagram, two 
WSACML Rules with the corresponding names are 
derived. Using “first-applicable” as 
RuleSelectionAlgorithm implies the first matching rule 
defines the Effect of the Policy. StudentSelfService 
contains two Assertions that need to be evaluated to 
true so that the Rule can be applied. First, the attribute 
“role” of the calling subject needs to be “student”, 
second the subject’s attribute “identifier” has to be 
identical to the input parameter with the name 
“matriculation” of the service invocation. To match the 
usage context of a student consultation process, the 
calling subject needs to have the attribute “role” with a 
value of “counselor”. In case of an access control 
request, the rule StudentSelfService is checked first. If 
the subject attribute role does not match, this Rule’s 
assertions do not evaluate to true so the Rule is not 
applicable. The next Rule is evaluated until one is 
applicable. Then this Rule’s Effect defines the overall 
access decision. Keep in mind that this WSACML 
Policy consisting of two Rules is completely 
independent from a concrete IdM product which we 
will consider in the next section. 
 
<SmRealm Name=‘createToR_policy’
ResourceFilter=‘ToRService/createToR’>
<PolicyLink>
<SmRule Name=‘StudentConsultation’
AllowAccess=‘true’ />
<SmPolicy Name=‘StudentConsultation’>
<SmUserPolicy
FilterPath=‘cn=counselor, ou=roles, dc=com’
FilterClass=‘organizationalUnit’
PolicyResoultion=‘5’
PolicyFlags=‘0’ />
</SmPolicy>
</PolicyLink>
</SmRealm>  
Figure 8. Exemplary SiteMinder Policy (PSM) 
 
At present we use SiteMinder as the policy decision 
point in our IdM architecture. By using platform-
independent WSACML for policy specification and 
transformations to SiteMinder, we are not limited to 
this product. When deploying a Web service, its 
WSACML Rules according to its Policy are collected 
and the transformation is applied. We use the XSLT 
processor of Oracle JDeveloper. Figure 8 shows a 
SiteMinder policy that has been transformed from the 
WSACML policy in figure 7 using the transformation 
depicted in figure 4. With the PSM policies then 
conforming in a structural and syntactical way to 
SiteMinder’s policy model we developed a Java-based 
policy import tool which uses SiteMinder’s policy API 
for the final import to its policy store. 
 
6. Conclusion and Further Work 
 
In this paper we presented Web Service Access 
Control Markup Language (WSACML) which allows 
modeling of access control policies for Web services at 
design time. It is platform-independent related to the 
IdM product that is applied at runtime. We designed 
both an access control model and a concrete language 
and showed how to refactor an appropriate model of an 
existing IdM product exemplarily considering CA 
eTrust SiteMinder. We illustrated how to apply our 
approach in a case study in a WSOA-based integration 
project. 
Our next steps are further work on how access 
control policies for Web service compositions relate to 
the policies of the atomic ones. Additionally, we will 
focus on policy lifecycle management. We addressed 
the creation of policies and want to add capabilities 
that enable auditing to ensure consistence between 
enterprise security requirements and implemented 
policies which implies reverse transformation. 
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